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ABSTRACT
We propose a scheme for defending against adversarial attacks by suppressing the largest eigenvalue
of the Fisher information matrix (FIM). Our starting point is one explanation on the rationale of
adversarial examples. Based on the idea of the difference between a benign sample and its adversarial
example is measured by the Euclidean norm, while the difference between their classification
probability densities at the last (softmax) layer of the network could be measured by the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence, the explanation shows that the output difference is a quadratic form of the
input difference. If the eigenvalue of this quadratic form (a.k.a. FIM) is large, the output difference
becomes large even when the input difference is small, which explains the adversarial phenomenon.
This makes the adversarial defense possible by controlling the eigenvalues of the FIM. Our solution
is adding one term representing the trace of the FIM to the loss function of the original network,
as the largest eigenvalue is bounded by the trace. Our defensive scheme is verified by experiments
using a variety of common attacking methods on typical deep neural networks, e.g. LeNet, VGG
and ResNet, with datasets MNIST, CIFAR-10, and German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark
(GTSRB). Our new network, after adopting the novel loss function and retraining, has an effective
and robust defensive capability, as it decreases the fooling ratio of the generated adversarial examples,
and remains the classification accuracy of the original network.
Keywords Adversarial attack · Adversarial defense · Fisher information matrix · Loss function · Deep neural network
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are samples added with carefully designed perturbations, such that those perturbed samples will
be misclassified by the Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for classification [1, 2]. In certain critical circumstances, such as
autonomous driving or security sensitive tasks, it is crucial to avoid such adversarial phenomenon. Therefore, defending
against adversarial attacks becomes a hot topic in machine learning [3].
In order to avoid/alleviate the adversarial phenomenon, it is important to reveal the rationale of adversarial examples.
Many explanations have been provided, yet no consensus has been reached. For example, [1] suggested that the
adversarial phenomenon is due to the excessive non-linearity of the neural networks. Later the idea was modified by
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Figure 1: Visualization for the results of our defensive scheme. Left column: two adversarial examples generated on
MNIST via the attack method OSSA. Middle column: the predicted label distributions by the original DNN, i.e., result
without using our defensive scheme. The blue/red bar represents the true/misclassified label, respectively. In row 1,
’6’ is misclassified as ’5’, and in row 2, ’5’ is misclassified as ’9’. Right column: the predicted label distribution of
our scheme by modifying the loss function of the original DNN. This figure demonstrates that we survive under the
adversarial attack and obtain the correct result. With our scheme, the label distribution is smoothed but the correct label
has the highest probability.
models being too linear [4]. Another explanation claimed that the phenomenon results from the high curvature regions
on the decision boundary [5].
In [6], the authors suggested that the vulnerability of DNNs may be caused by the large value of the largest eigenvalue
of the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM) induced by the input sample. Their idea is that the input difference of the DNNs
between a benign sample and its adversarial example is measured by the Euclidean norm, while the output difference
between their classification probability density vectors at the last (softmax) layer could no longer be measured by the
Euclidean norm, and should be measured by other suitable “distance” such as the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
Then, the output difference is a quadratic form of the input difference, and the quadratic matrix is the FIM. Thus, the
adversarial example can be constructed by setting the perturbation direction as the direction of the eigenvector for the
largest eigenvalue. This method is called One Step Spectral Attack (OSSA).
Inspired by [6], in this paper we propose a method for defending against adversarial attacks by only modifying the loss
function of the original DNN so that the largest eigenvalue of the FIM is suppressed. Here we first illustrate our result
in Figure 1. Details will be given in Section 3.
The novelties of the paper lie in:
1) Our scheme is simple yet effective, as it only adds one regularization term to the loss function of original DNNs
and needs to retrain only once. With our scheme, the capability of defending against adversarial examples can be
significantly improved;
2) Our scheme is explainable, as it is based on mathematical deduction. After the softmax layer, its output probability
distribution is similar to that of label smoothing [7], while ours provides a reasonable explanation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some related work on adversarial attacks and defense.
Section 3 describes our defensive scheme in detail with mathematical deduction, and makes a comparison with label
smoothing. Section 4 shows the experiments on defending against various white-box and black-box attacks on a variety
of datasets and DNNs. The paper is concluded in Section 5.
2 Related Work
In this section, we review some related work on adversarial attacks and defense.
Adversarial attacks
Adversarial attacks can be classified based on different criteria, while the most important and common criterion is
according to the measure of the perturbation, i.e., they can be classified as l0, l2 and l∞ attacks. Adversarial attacks can
also be targeted or non-targeted according to the misclassified label concerned, one-step attack or multi-step attack
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according to whether the adversarial example is generalized by one-step or by iteration, or white-box or black-box
attack according to whether the network structure and corresponding weights are known.
[4] proposed a simple and fast l∞ attack, called the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), by using the sign of the
gradient to generate perturbation. [8, 9] extended the gradient method to l2 norm, and proposed the Basic Iterative
Method (BIM), and other consequent more powerful attacking methods. [10] proposed the Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack,
which includes l0, l2, l∞ norms and can be applied to targeted or non-targeted attacks. [11] developed DeepFool, an
l2-norm and non-targeted method which uses iteration to push the image to the classification boundary iteratively.
Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA), an l0-norm targeted method proposed by [12], minimizes the number of
modified pixels so that the image is misclassified as a particular (wrong) target class. Those more powerful methods all
adopt the iterative optimization methods, such that the perturbation is small yet effective. To achieve such a goal, simple
methods, e.g., FGSM, usually need to conduct searches on certain particular perturbation space, such as binary search.
Adversarial defenses
The adversarial phenomenon naturally spawns many works on defending against adversarial attacks for DNNs. To date,
these adversarial defenses can be roughly categorized into the following three types:
1) Data pre-processing. This kind of method pre-processes the input data during the training and testing, which includes
image gradient processing, transforming, denoising, enhancing, or a small scale network training to pre-process the
input.
2) Classification model modification. This kind of method increases/deletes/modifies certain layers, or modifies the loss
function and the activation function.
3) Robust learning. This kind of method includes adversarial training and robust gradient descent techniques. Note that
here adversarial training is in its narrow sense, meaning using adversarial examples as a part of the training data.
Adversarial training [1] trains the model by repeatedly feeding the adversarial examples into the training set, such
that the new model can possess certain defensive capability. Due to its simplicity and effectiveness, many adversarial
attacking methods, e.g., [6], also used adversarial training for evaluation. [6] also proposed a novel approach for
adversarial detection, i.e., when an adversarial example is detected, warning is triggered and further processing aborts.
[13] proposed a robust optimization method called Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). Based on the corollary of a
classical result in [14], PGD uses the gradient descent method to obtain an optimized defensive network. Note that
PGD is also an attack method from another point of view. [13] was adopted by many defensive methods such as the
thermometer encoding [15].
More recently, the method of Label Smoothing Regularization (LSR) receives attention in adversarial defense. Intro-
duced by [7], LSR was first used for improving the performance of Inception network and now has become a common
technique for DNN regularization. LSR can improve the generalization capability and also increase the classification
accuracy by a small amount. The role of LSR in adversarial defense was observed by experiments in [16]. [17] proposed
many variants of LSR for adversarial defense.
3 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we first summarize the mechanism of adversarial phenomenon proposed in [6]. Then based on that
mechanism, we propose our solution for defending against adversarial attacks, followed by the analysis of our scheme.
3.1 Our starting point
The starting work of our defensive scheme is [6]. Its basic idea can be summarized as follows.
Given a (gray) image of m× n, the aim of a classification problem is to classify it as K classes.
Suppose that the image has been pulled as a (column) vector x with the length m× n, and its perturbed image is x′ =
x+ η, where η is the perturbation. After certain DNN, their softmax layer outputs are s(x) = [p1(x), · · · , pK(x)]T
and s(x+ η) = [p1(x′), · · · , pK(x′)]T , where pi ≥ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,K and
∑K
i=1 pi = 1.
Denote the probability that x belongs to the i-th class by p(yi|x), where yi is a one hot vector yi =
[y1, · · · , yi, · · · , yK ]T where yi = 1 and yj = 0 for j 6= i. Thus, p(yi|x) = pi(x), and s(x) =
[p(y1|x), · · · , p(yK |x)]T . The classification label i is determined by i = arg max
j
pj(x).
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The distance between x and x + η can be measured by lk norm, where k can be chosen as 1, 2, or∞. In [6], k is
chosen as 2, i.e., the Euclidean norm is used. However, the Euclidean norm cannot be used as a measure of distance
between s(x) and s(x′), as {s(x)} does not form a linear space. A suitable measure is the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence, denoted by DKL.
Let y be the random variable ranging from y1 to yK with the distribution density p(y|x), where p(y|x) = p(yi|x) =
pi(x) if y = yi for i = 1, · · · ,K. Then we can expand DKL using the 2nd order Taylor expansion, i.e.,
DKL(s(x)‖s(x+ η)) = Ey[log p(y|x)
p(y|x+ η) ] ≈
1
2
ηTGxη, (1)
whereGx = Ey[(∇x log p(y|x))(∇x log p(y|x))T ] is the FIM of x.
Note that the quadratic form (1) becomes large if the largest eigenvalue of the FIM, λmax(Gx), is large. Therefore,
adversarial phenomenon may occur if λmax(Gx) is large.
The quadratic form (1) can be used to generate the adversarial attack. OSSA is constructed by maximizing (1) under
some constraints, i.e.,
max
η
ηTGxη s.t. ‖η‖22 = ε, J(y,x+ η) > J(y,x),
where ε denotes the squared norm of the perturbation, and J is the loss function.
Therefore, the problem of constructing adversarial examples is converted to the problem of finding the largest eigenvalue
λmax(Gx) and its corresponding eigenvector η of Gx, i.e., Gxη = λmaxη. That is, the perturbation η should be the
product of the length
√
ε and the normalized eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue.
3.2 Our Scheme
This subsection is devoted to how to construct our defensive scheme for adversarial attacks.
Since larger eigenvalue of Gx may cause the larger difference of KL divergence, and consequently cause the adversarial
phenomenon, one solution for defending against adversarial attacks is to control λmax(Gx) induced by the input sample.
A natural approach is to add a regularization term to the loss function of the original network to suppress the largest
eigenvalue λmax(Gx) of the FIM Gx, i.e., modify the loss function as
L(Θ) + µ · λmax(Gx), (2)
where µ is the regularization parameter, L(Θ) is the loss function of the original network, and Θ is the set of parameters
of the original network.
Two problems prevent the direct use of the loss function (2). One is that the matrix Gx is too large. For example, given
a 1000× 1000 image, it is a vector of length 106 after conversion, which means that Gx is 106 × 106. The other is that
it is difficult to explicitly write down the formula of λmax(Gx), even if we can tackle the big matrix.
The first problem can be settled by the following strategy. We turn our focus from Gx to a new matrix Gs, where s is
the output of the softmax layer s = [p1(x), · · · , pK(x)]T . Similar to Gx, we have
Gs = Ey[∇s log p(y|s) · [∇s log p(y|s)]T ].
Note that Gs is a K ×K positive definite matrix.
We have
ηTGxη = η
TEy[JT∇s log p(y|s)[JT∇s log p(y|s)]T ]η
= ηTJTEy[∇s log p(y|s) · [∇s log p(y|s)]T ]Jη,
where J =
(
∂si
∂xα
)
is a K ×mn Jacobian of s = s(x), and ∇x = JT∇s.
Then,
ηTGxη = η
TJTGsJη.
Thus the first problem is settled by converting calculating the largest eigenvalue and corresponding eigenvector of a
large mn×mn matrix into calculating those of a much smaller K ×K matrix.
Then the loss function can be further written as
L(Θ) + µλmax(Gs). (3)
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Note that although (2) is greatly simplified as (3), the problem of no explicit expression for λmax(Gs) still exists.
The second problem could be solved via replacing the largest eigenvalue λ(Gs) by the trace of Gs, as the trace equals
the summation of all eigenvalues which are all positive due to the positive definiteness of Gs. Thus, our loss function
changes to
L(Θ) + µ trGs.
The trace of Gs can be calculated as follows.
trGs = trEy[∇s log p(y|s) · [∇s log p(y|s)]T ]
=
∫
y
p(y|s)[tr((∇s log p(y|s))T (∇s log p(y|s))]
=
∫
y
p(y|s) · ‖∇s log p(y|s)‖22
=
K∑
i=1
pi
K∑
j=1
(∇pj log p(yi|s))2
=
K∑
i=1
pi
K∑
j=1
(∇pj log pi)2
=
K∑
i=1
1
pi
.
Thus the final loss function for the defensive scheme turns to be
L˜(Θ) = L(Θ) + µ ·
K∑
i=1
1
pi
s.t.
K∑
i=1
pi = 1. (4)
To summarize, we improve the defensive capability of the original DNNs by modifying its loss function as (4), and keep
everything else. Of course, due to this modification, the new model should be retrained. That is, the optimal parameters
for our defensive network can be obtained by solving
Θ∗ = arg min
Θ
L˜(Θ).
3.3 Analysis of the proposed scheme
Note that the solution of arg min
pk
∑K
i=1
1
pi
is p1 = · · · = pk = 1K under the constraints, which indicates that the effect
of the regularization term
∑K
i=1
1
pi
is to force [p1, · · · , pK ]T move towards the central point [1/K, · · · , 1/K]T . In
other words, it will prevent from the point to the positions such as [0, · · · , 1, · · · , 0]T . It is natural to worry that this
will decrease the classification accuracy of DNNs. In what follows, we claim that this is not the case.
Adding the term
∑K
i=1
1
pi
indeed will cause the minimizer of [p1, · · · , pK ]T move towards [1/K, · · · , 1/K]T , but that
point will not be reached due to the existence of the first term in the loss function (4). This tendency of moving towards
the center part of the simplex is no harm, as what we really care is the correctness of i∗ = arg max
i
pi, not the value of
pi∗ . Therefore, we do not pursue the large value of pi∗ , as long as pi∗ reaches maximum among all pi for i = 1, · · · ,K.
The above argument also reveals a fact that, although it may be different from intuition, high confidence (or over-
confidence) on the classification result of one sample is unreliable sometimes. The reason is that over-confidence on
one Class i means that the value of pi is large and consequently some values of pj should be small for j 6= i. One
extreme case is some pj = 0 and therefore
∑K
i=1
1
pK
→∞. In other words, this over-confidence sample is sensitive to
the adversarial perturbation and therefore vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
The experiments provided in Section 4 will demonstrate that, after using our loss function, the classification accuracy
remains while the risk of adversarial phenomenon decreases.
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3.4 Comparison with Label Smoothing Regularization
Both our scheme and LSR tend to smooth the labels, while the desired label still has the highest probability. To emphasis
their difference, we explain LSR and compare these two methods.
The basic procedure of LSR can be described as two steps. Firstly, for k ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, modify the component of
one-hot label as:
yLSRk = yk(1− α) + α/K,
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a hyperparameter, yk is the label component whose value is 1 for the correct class and 0 for the rest,
and K is the total number of classes. Second, retrain the network with the new labels.
LSR makes the classification clusters much tighter, according to the experiments in [18]. This, to some extent, explains
why LSR is effective in adversarial defense. The underlying rationale of LSR, however, is still unknown. LSR needs to
have a not commonly accepted prior assumption, i.e., the labels are uniformly distributed for classes other than the true
class, while our scheme is based on strict mathematical deduction and does not have such a premise. Therefore, ours
has a better explainability.
4 Experiments
The main purpose of our experiments is to demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our defensive scheme, and
therefore to demonstrate the correctness of using the loss function (4).
How to evaluate the capability of a network for defending against adversarial examples is a complicated issue. Here, we
illustrate four aspects of the complexities.
1) Adversarial examples is a relative concept. For instance, a sample is an adversarial example for Network A, it may be
a benign sample for Network B, and vice versa. For instance, the perturbed digits ’5’ and ’6’ in Figure 1 are adversarial
examples for the network corresponding to Column 2, but not for Column 3.
2) The effect of the perturbation norm. If the norm is sufficiently large, the perturbed image will be significantly
different from the original image, therefore it will be “misclassified” as another class. In other words, every sample will
be an adversarial example if its perturbation norm is sufficiently large. Therefore, when talking about how to defend
against adversarial attack, we usually assume that the perturbation is small. However, the large perturbation norm can
be used to show the defensive capability. Given a sample with large perturbation, if it is an adversarial example in
Network A but not in Network B, we can say that Network B is “better” for this particular sample.
3) It is not meaningful for talking about defensive capability for a single sample. So some statistical index should be
used. Say, given 1000 perturbed images, a% of them are misclassified in Network A, and b% of them are misclassified
in Network B. If b < a, then we can conclude B is better.
4) Defensive capability depends on different attacking methods. A network, which can defend against perturbed
examples generated from the attacking method 1, may fail for the attacking method 2, and vice versa.
Here we design the experiments according to four aspects mentioned above.
For 1), in what follows, our scheme means for a given original network, using the loss function (4) and we have
re-trained the network and have obtained its new parameters Θ∗. Using the term in the previous description, the original
network is A and our scheme is B.
For 2), in the case of l2 norm, we use the perturbation norm defined as ε =
√∑n
i=1(xi − x′i)2 for two vectors
x = [x1, · · · , xn]T and x′ = [x′1, · · · , x′n]T , in which each component is within the interval [0, 1].
Note that by our definition, ε = 1 is a large perturbation. For example, for two vectors from MNIST, if their grey value
difference is 10 at each component, then ε =
√
( 10255 )
2 · 282 ≈ 1.1.
For 3), we use the fooling ratio as the index to show the defensive capability. Its definition is as follows. Given a set of
originally correctly classified samples, after adding perturbation, some samples become misclassified. The ratio of the
number of misclassified sample to the total sample number is called the fooling ratio. Clearly, the lower the fooling
ratio, the better the performance of the network.
For 4), we use ten attacking methods for white-box and black-box attacks, respectively. Most of them have been
discussed in Section 2. The white-box attack assumes that the attackers know all the details of the classifier, including
the model and parameters, while the black-box attack assumes all the details are unknown and the adversarial examples
are fed into the network.
6
Defending Against Adversarial Attacks by Suppressing the Largest Eigenvalue of Fisher Information Matrix
Figure 2: Classification accuracies of the baseline and our scheme with various coefficient values on MNIST under
OSSA.
Datasets and classification methods used in the experiments
In the experiments, three datasets, together with corresponding neural networks, are utilized. These datasets and
networks consist of 1) MNIST+ConvNet, 2) CIFAR-10+VGG, and 3) German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark
(GTSRB)+ResNet. The first two datasets are common benchmarks, and the third one is used as a demonstration for real
applications such as autonomous driving.
MNIST [19] is equipped with a simple CNN network, which is a variant of LeNet and called ConvNet here. ConvNet
has two convolutional layers with batch normalization and one fully connected layer. Before defensive training, this
simple network can reach a classification accuracy of 99%.
CIFAR-10 [20] is equipped with a simplified VGG. This VGG network adopts a variant of simplified 11 layers in order
to fit the dataset size. Before defensive training, this model can reach a classification accuracy of around 90.5%.
GTSRB 2 [21] consists of more than 50,000 images of traffic signal in 43 classes. This dataset has 39,209 training
images and 12,630 testing images. To facilitate the procedure, we use 39,200 training and 12,600 testing images and
rescale the image size to 32× 32. GTSRB is equipped with a simplified ResNet with 14 layers to accelerate the training.
Before defensive training, the accuracy is around 98.5%.
4.1 Defending against white-box attacks
We compare the fooling ratio under 1) various values of the regularization coefficient, 2) various datasets and neural
network models, and 3) various attacking methods.
Fooling ratios with various values of the regularization coefficient
We compare the capability for generating adversarial examples under various values of the regularization coefficient µ,
all other parameters are set as the same, i.e., dataset+DNN: MNIST+ConvNet, and the attacking method for generating
adversarial examples: OSSA. The purpose of this experiment is to show the effectiveness of our scheme when a suitable
value of µ > 0 is set.
We wish to observe that fooling ratio becomes low, compared with the original network, while the accuracy for the
testing data does not decrease using our scheme.
Figures 2 and 3 verify the above claim. Figure 2 shows that, using our scheme, the accuracy remains virtually unchanged,
while Figure 3 shows that the fooling ratio significantly decreases.
In Figure 2, the dotted line is the baseline classification accuracy of the original network, i.e., the ConvNet without
defensive training, on MNIST. The dotted line is obtained by averaging the accuracies of several experiments. Figure 2
shows that the accuracy remains virtually unchanged (fluctuated around 98.95%) using our scheme.
2http://benchmark.ini.rub.de
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Figure 3: The fooling ratio curves with various regularization coefficient values. All data are obtained on MNIST, using
OSSA.
Figure 3 shows that, under certain range of parameters, with the increment of the regularization coefficient µ, the
fooling ratio of the generated adversarial examples decreases monotonically. When µ = 0.022 and ε = 6 (ε = 6 is a
large distance, as we discussed previously) the fooling ratio is suppressed significantly small (less than 10%), while the
classification accuracy is still as high as 98.8% in Figure 2. Since the fooling ratio reflects the defensive capability, low
fooling ratio means that the defensive capability is satisfactory.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that our scheme obtains the defensive capability without sacrificing the accuracy.
Fooling ratios on various datasets and DNNs
In this subsection, we compare the defensive capability for our scheme under various datasets+DNNs, on the same
attacking algorithm OSSA. The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate our robustness on different datasets and DNNs.
Figure 4: The fooling ratio curves on three datasets with corresponding DNN models, with or without adding µ. All
experimental data are generated by OSSA.
Figure 4 shows the fooling ratio curves under three datasets and their corresponding DNNs. It reveals that, for all cases,
the fooling ratio decreases when a suitable µ > 0 is set.
Fooling ratios on various attacking methods
In this subsection, we compare the defensive capability of our scheme under various attacks. The defensive scheme is
set as µ = 0.02 for MNIST+ConvNet. Three non-OSSA one-step attack methods, namely, FGM [9], OTCM [9] and
FGSM, are used for the experiment. All three attacking methods are implemented by ourselves. Here OTCM is the
acronym for One-step Target Class Method.
The purpose of this experiment is to verify the robustness on various attacking methods.
8
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Figure 5: The fooling ratio curves of three adversarial attacking methods on MNIST.
Figure 5 shows that the fooling ratios are low, when the perturbation norm are small (which is the case we are interested
in). However, these fooling ratios are high compared with their counterparts in Figure 4. This is reasonable that our
method is inspired by [6] where OSSA is proposed. When ε is large, e.g., ε = 6, our scheme fails as the fooling ratio is
higher than 60%.
Defensive capability on more attacking methods using FoolBox To further evaluate the defensive capability under
more attacks, we adopt a toolbox called FoolBox3 [22] which provides various popular attacking methods.
The toolbox aims to obtain the optimized adversarial examples, i.e., the perturbation should be as small as possible
when generating the adversarial examples. So, for a given perturbation norm, it does not generate adversarial examples
accordingly. Therefore, we use the distance between the original input and the adversarial example as a measurement
for the degree of difficulty for generating an adversarial example in DNNs. The larger the distance, the more difficult
the capability of generating adversarial examples, i.e., the better the defensive capability.
Table 1 lists the distances between the original input and the adversarial example, for the original network (µ = 0) and
our scheme (µ = 0.024), under nine attacking methods, with MNIST. In the experiments, we load the pretrained model
and samples from MNIST as the input for the testing. Then we use the method provided in FoolBox to generate a batch
of adversarial examples, and obtain the distance between every adversarial example and its original input. The second
column shows the norms used in the attacks. Columns 3 and 4 show the mean distance between the adversarial and
original inputs. The above mean distance can be used as a measure for the degree of difficulty on generating adversarial
examples, as the same parameters are used for generating adversarial examples for two models. The larger the distance,
the more difficult for generating adversarial examples. Table 1 shows that, for all nine methods, our scheme outperforms
as our mean distances are larger, and the distance ratio is between 1:1.3 and 1:1.8. This demonstrates the robustness of
our method.
Table 1: Comparison of distances between the original input and its adversarial example for two models using MNIST.
Method Norm Mean Distance Mean Distance
on Original Model on Our Scheme
FGSM l∞ 0.107 0.170
FGM l2 0.00584 0.00791
BIM l1 0.0210 0.0273
BIM l2 0.00158 0.00273
BIM l∞ 0.0726 0.1070
DeepFool l2 0.00215 0.00267
CW l2 0.00145 0.00204
JSMA l0 28.26 48.19
Random PGD l∞ 0.0730 0.1100
4.2 Defending against black-box attacks
Our scheme is further tested for defending against black-box attacks.
3https://foolbox.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html#
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Table 2 lists the results on MNIST+ConvNet. All adversarial examples are generated by FoolBox, except that OSSA
in the last row is generated by ourselves with the parameter ε = 1.0. Specifically, given a sample, we use a method
provided in the FoolBox and generate an adversarial example for the Network A. This sample is adversarial for the
original network A, we test whether it is still adversarial for Network B. Similarly, we can also generate an adversarial
example for Network B and see whether it is adversarial in Network A. We wish to see, given a batch of samples, using
the above operation, samples generated from the original network still have high accuracy (i.e., low fooling ratio) by
our scheme, while adversarial examples of our scheme will have a low accuracy for the original network, as we assume
our scheme has a higher defensive capability than the original network.
In the table, Columns 2 and 3 show the above cross model classification accuracies. The value (97.47%) in row 1
and column 2 means that, for example, we first use FGSM from FoolBox to attack the original network and generate
adversarial examples, and input these adversarial examples to our scheme, then in our scheme the accuracy is 97.47%.
This means that the accuracy raises from 0% of the original network to 97.47% of our scheme.
Note that there is no value at the last row and last column. The reason is that our scheme can defend against OSSA
significantly and no adversarial examples can be generated for ε = 1.0. It seems that the accuracies in column 2 are
higher than expected. We analyze the reason as that the adversarial examples generated by FoolBox are optimal with
respect to perturbation, which means that it may not be optimal for a defensive model and therefore its defense is
relatively easy. In general, the classification accuracy in column 3 is lower than that in column 2, as we have analyzed.
Thus we can conclude that our model behaves reasonably acceptable for black-box attacks, although the difference of
accuracies is not sufficiently large. It might be combined with other defense techniques to achieve better performance.
Table 2: Cross model classification accuracies on MNIST.
Generated from Generated from
Attacking original network our scheme
methods Tested on Tested on
our scheme original network
FGSM (l∞) 97.47% 54.33%
FGM (l2) 96.74% 78.18%
BIM (l1) 98.79% 93.12%
BIM (l2) 98.79% 93.72%
BIM (l∞) 98.89% 89.07%
DeepFool (l2) 98.58% 93.64%
CW (l2) 98.79% 97.47%
JSMA (l0) 96.09% 90.45%
Random PGD (l∞) 98.99% 89.57%
OSSA (l2) 92.24% –
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a defensive scheme for adversarial attacks by modifying the loss function of DNNs to control the
largest eigenvalue of the FIM. Our scheme stems from the assumption that the vulnerability of DNNs is due to the the
large value of the largest eigenvalue of FIM. Elaborated by experimental results on typical DNNs with various datasets,
our scheme demonstrates its capability of defending against adversarial attacks.
Our contributions can be summarized as: 1) Our scheme is a simple yet effective regularization method. Compared with
other adversarial training methods, it only needs to retrain once; 2) our scheme has an explainable property compared
with LSR; and 3) the effectiveness is demonstrated by various DNNs on common datasets.
Future work can be focused on using the theory of simplex to further improve the loss function, as the density vectors
are on a simplex.
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